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TURNING AGENTS INTO PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPALS: 
ALIGNING INTERESTS OF NON-OWNERS THROUGH PSYCHOLOGICAL 
OWNERSHIP 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Principals who delegate tasks to agents face the perennial challenge of overcoming agency 
problems. We investigate whether feelings of ownership among senior managers in the absence 
of formal ownership can align agents’ interests with those of principals, thus turning agents into 
psychological principals. Using a moderated mediation model, we find that psychological 
ownership is positively related to company performance through the mediating effect of 
individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour. We also find that the effect of psychological 
ownership on individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour and, ultimately, company performance 
is weaker for high levels of monitoring compared to low levels. These findings offer important 
contributions to agency, psychological ownership, and entrepreneurship literatures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Conventional wisdom tells us that no one cares about a company as much as its owners. 
Making non-owning agents think and act like owning principals is therefore a perennial 
challenge for many organizations. The vast literature on agency theory is devoted to analysing 
this problem (Daily, Dalton & Rajagopalan, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Scholars have proposed different approaches to align the interests of owners and non-owners and 
reduce agency costs. Among these are bonuses, profit sharing, and stock ownership plans (Ang, 
Cole & Lin, 2000; Dalton, Daily, Certo & Roengpitya, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989). However, these 
measures are costly and can crowd out intrinsic motivation (Block & Ornati, 1987; Chrisman, 
Chua, Kellermanns & Chang, 2007). In addition, owners may be hesitant to implement stock 
ownership plans because they dilute control rights. Another drawback to these approaches is that 
their link to actual company performance has not been firmly established (cp. Dalton et al., 2003; 
Pugh, Oswald & Jahera, 2000; Tosi, Werner, Katz & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). These inconclusive 
findings call for a fresh look at other factors that might help reduce agency costs.  
With regard to stock ownership plans, scholars claim that for behavioural alterations among 
owners to occur, formal ownership must first induce feelings of ownership (Pierce & Furo, 1990; 
Pierce, Rubenfeld & Morgan, 1991). Presumably, these feelings only develop when ownership 
plans encompass certain rights associated with ownership, such as the right to obtain information 
and to exercise influence (Pierce & Furo, 1990). Agency theory implicitly assumes that more 
formal ownership automatically leads to stronger ownership feelings. Given the mixed findings 
regarding the performance effect of stock ownership plans, however, this assumption might not 
be universally valid. Put differently, a model that focuses only on formal aspects of ownership 
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and neglects its psychological elements is likely to be under-specified. Interestingly, ownership 
feelings may arise even in the absence of legal ownership (Pierce, Kostova & Dirks, 2001). 
We build on these theoretical considerations by applying the concept of psychological 
ownership (Pierce, Kostova & Dirks, 2003), defined as "the state in which individuals feel as 
though the target of ownership or a piece of that target is 'theirs'" (Pierce et al., 2003, p. 86). We 
hypothesize that it is possible for the interests of agents to be aligned with those of principals in 
the absence of legal ownership for purely psychological reasons (Eisenhardt, 1989). Building on 
the notion of psychological ownership as a way to alleviate agency problems, we report (to our 
knowledge) the first empirical test of the argument that psychological ownership can turn agents 
into "psychological principals" (Pierce et al., 2003, p. 101), resulting in both psychological 
owners and principals sharing the goal of improving company performance (Chrisman et al., 
2007; Dalton et al., 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
To establish the link between psychological ownership and company performance, we 
introduce individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour as a mediator in this relationship. We chose 
this variable to test our arguments for several reasons. First, individual-level entrepreneurial 
behaviour, generally understood as all actions taken by firm members that relate to the discovery 
and exploitation of entrepreneurial ideas and opportunities (Hornsby, Kuratko, Shepherd & Bott, 
2009; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Smith & Di Gregorio, 2002), has been shown to be an 
antecedent of firm-level corporate entrepreneurship (Kuratko, Ireland, Covin & Hornsby, 2005). 
In turn, corporate entrepreneurship has been confirmed as a predictor of firm performance 
(Sharma & Chrisman, 1999; Zahra, Jennings & Kuratko, 1999). These established relationships 
allow us to deduce a theoretically defensible rationale that connects psychological ownership to 
company performance through individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour. Second, we contend 
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that within the broader context of entrepreneurship literature and agency theory, there is reason 
to believe that the behaviours that define entrepreneurial behaviour are likely to differ reliably as 
a function of whether someone is the owner or non-owner of a company. According to agency 
theory, an owner’s ultimate goal is to improve company performance, thereby increasing the 
value of his or her ownership stake (Daily et al., 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; McDonald, 
Khanna & Westphal, 2008). An obvious way to achieve this goal is to engage in individual-level 
entrepreneurial behaviour (Hornsby et al., 2009; Zahra et al., 1999). Assuming, in line with 
agency theory, that principals and agents will act in ways that advance their own interests, the 
former should be more willing to exhibit entrepreneurial behaviour than the latter simply because 
the economic benefits they derive from it are greater (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that one way to demonstrate whether psychological ownership can turn 
agents into psychological principals is to see whether agents with strong ownership feelings are 
more inclined, compared to those with weak ownership feelings, to exhibit a behaviour that 
should be observed more frequently from principals than agents.  
Demonstrating an empirical relationship between agents’ psychological ownership and 
company performance through entrepreneurial behaviour represents a first indication that 
ownership feelings in the absence of legal ownership can align the interests of agents and 
principals. However, we qualify this hypothesis by showing that the effectiveness of 
psychological ownership to create such alignment depends on the level of monitoring. Research 
suggests that monitoring through observation and constant evaluation, while being costly, can be 
an effective way of motivating agents to behave more like principals (Chrisman et al., 2007; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). Monitoring is an external influence on employee behaviour that operates 
independently of psychological ownership, but both work in the same direction of motivating 
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agents to act like principals. If so, and if our arguments related to agency theory and 
psychological ownership are correct, then the positive effect of psychological ownership on 
entrepreneurial behaviour and, ultimately, company performance should be stronger when 
monitoring is low and relatively weaker when monitoring is high. The reason is that high 
monitoring will have a strong beneficial effect on entrepreneurial behaviour of agents with low 
psychological ownership; when ownership feelings rise, however, the beneficial effect of high 
monitoring will be reduced due to interest alignment induced by psychological ownership. Our 
moderated mediation model (see also Preacher, Rucker & Hayes, 2007) is illustrated in Figure 1. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
We tested our hypotheses using a random sample of 714 non-owning senior managers from 
Switzerland and Germany. Our findings make three main contributions. First, we contribute to 
the broader agency theory literature by examining whether psychological ownership in the 
absence of legal ownership aligns the interests of agents and principals, thus establishing 
psychological ownership as a viable alternative to alleviate agency problems (Daily et al., 2003; 
Dalton, Hitt, Certo & Dalton, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989) and suggesting a possible explanation for 
previous inconclusive findings regarding the effect of managers’ stock ownership (Daily et al., 
2003; Dalton et al., 2003; Pugh et al., 2000). Second, we contribute to the psychological 
ownership literature, as our study, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to empirically test the 
claim that psychological ownership can turn agents into psychological principals (Pierce et al., 
2003). We also address psychological ownership scholars by proposing and empirically 
validating a link between ownership feelings and individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour 
(Avey, Avolio, Crossley & Luthans, 2009; Pierce, O'Driscoll & Coghlan, 2004). Third, our 
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findings contribute to the entrepreneurship literature by demonstrating that individual-level 
entrepreneurial behaviour is an appropriate indicator whether someone has ownership feelings or 
not. In addition, we extend existing literature (e.g., Kuratko, 2010; Kuratko et al., 2005) as we 
confirm a link between individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour and company performance.  
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Agency theory 
Agency theory has long been a dominant paradigm in organization and management theory 
(Daily et al., 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Its building block is the 
relationship between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) (Berle & Means, 1932; 
Werner, Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 2005), whereby "the principal(s) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent" (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 5). This relationship introduces two main 
challenges to the maximization of organizational performance. 
The first cause of so-called agency problems are incongruent interests of principal and agent, 
induced by individuals’ tendency to be opportunistic, self-interested, risk averse, and limited by 
bounded rationality (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agents may diversify 
excessively, build empires (Tan & Peng, 2003), or adopt a low-risk/low-return strategy for the 
firm due to their inability to diversify employment risks (Cruz, Gomez-Mejia & Becerra, 2010). 
This misalignment of interests leads to goal conflicts and, ultimately, to agent behaviour that 
deviates from principals’ desires. Second, agents can hide negative actions from principals due to 
information asymmetries, which make it difficult and expensive for the principal to verify the 
agents’ actions (Ross, 1973). As a consequence, agents’ self-serving behaviour cannot be 
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prevented by contracting, also because not all possible eventualities can be included in such a 
contract (Eisenhardt, 1989; Williamson, 1981). Unobservable behaviour may result from moral 
hazard, with the agent shirking his/her duties or may be induced by adverse selection, where an 
agent is hired based on misrepresentation of skills (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In light of these challenges, many agency writings have been trying to identify mechanisms to 
curb managerial mischief that is detrimental to company performance, the principals’ ultimate 
interest (Daily et al., 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; McDonald et al., 2008). To overcome 
information asymmetries and to detect agent behaviour, principals use monitoring mechanisms 
such as personal direct observation, regular assessment of short-term output, measuring progress 
toward long-term goals, consulting subordinates, punishments, and managerial processes 
(Chrisman et al., 2007). To align the interests of agents and principals, incentive systems such as 
bonuses, profit sharing, and stock ownership plans can be introduced (Ang et al., 2000; Brown, 
Sturman & Simmering, 2003; Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart & Carpenter, 2010). Agent stock 
ownership is presumed not only to align interests, but also to curb moral hazard, since agent 
wealth then co-varies with principal wealth (Dalton et al., 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Nyberg et al., 
2010). However, stock ownership plans suffer from important disadvantages. Examples are costs 
incurred by the principal in the form of dividend payments and the need to share increased equity 
value. In addition, the dilution of ownership rights limits the principals’ ability to exercise 
control (Morck, 1996) and to reap its private financial and non-financial benefits (Gomez-Mejia, 
Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). Moreover, financial incentives in 
general may crowd out agents’ intrinsic motivation (Block & Ornati, 1987; Osterloh & Frey, 
2000), and the relationship between agent stock ownership and company performance is still a 
matter of debate (Daily et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 2003; Pugh et al., 2000; Tosi et al., 2000). 
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Agency theory, which is predicated on the idea that interest alignment through formal 
ownership is the necessary and sufficient condition for behavioural alterations of agents (Alchian 
& Demsetz, 1972; Fama & Jensen, 1983), suggests that agents who own shares will 
automatically alter their behaviour and seek to maximize the value of their ownership stake. 
However, psychology scholars have noted that formal ownership does not automatically produce 
favourable outcomes. Pierce and Furo (1990) argue that to be effective, stock ownership 
programs must not only provide the right to own equity, but also the right to obtain information 
and the right to exercise influence. Only when these rights are granted and perceived as such, a 
psychological sense of ownership will emerge (Pierce & Furo, 1990). And only when 
psychological ownership is present, behavioural consequences will occur in the next step (Pierce 
& Furo, 1990; Pierce et al., 1991). Without ownership feelings, “it is unlikely that employee-
owners will differ from non-owners” (Pierce & Furo, 1990, p. 37). Ownership feelings, however, 
may even emerge in the complete absence of formal ownership (Pierce et al., 2003; Pierce et al., 
2001). It thus seems reasonable to propose that ownership feelings without formal ownership can 
produce the same attitudinal and behavioural outcomes as formal ownership. At the same time, 
they avoid some of the disadvantages associated with agents’ stock ownership. Psychological 
ownership is thus an alternative way of aligning agents' interests with those of principals. 
 
Psychological ownership 
Psychological ownership builds on a long history of philosophical and psychological research 
on the genesis of possessive tendencies in the form that something is "mine" (see Etzioni, 1991; 
Furby, 1978). Research suggests that ownership may fulfil more than the utilitarian or 
instrumental function that is taken as axiomatic by agency theory (Pierce et al., 2003; Pierce et 
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al., 2001). Ownership, both legal and psychological, can satisfy three human motives. First, it 
can nurture feelings of efficacy, since “to have” is the ultimate form of control; being in control 
leads to the perception that one is “the cause" and, as such, has altered or is able to alter 
circumstances (Beggan, 1992). Second, ownership helps people define themselves, express their 
self-identity to others, and maintain the continuity of the self. As such, one’s actual or perceived 
possessions can forge identity and maintain self-continuity (Price, Arnould & Folkman Curasi, 
2000). Finally, scholars suggest that a sense of place and, hence, the need for territoriality and 
security, may also be nurtured by ownership (Porteous, 1976). 
A critical assumption of psychological ownership is that formal ownership is not necessary 
for ownership feelings and behavioural alterations to emerge (Pierce et al., 2001). For example, 
people may perceive a rented apartment as “theirs” and act upon this ownership feeling as if 
they were the legal owner (i.e., by cleaning or performing maintenance). This expectation builds 
on the premise that possessions can become part of the extended self (Belk, 1988; Dittmar, 1992) 
even in the absence of enforceable property rights. In contrast, as outlined before, it is also 
possible that legal owners do not exhibit ownership feelings (Pierce & Furo, 1990).  
Due to the sense of possession as its conceptual core, psychological ownership differs from 
other constructs that might at first glance appear to share the same conceptual space (cp. Pierce 
et al., 2001; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). It asks, “How much do I feel this organization is mine” 
(Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004, p. 443). Organizational commitment asks: “Why should I maintain 
my membership in this organization” (cp. Meyer & Allen, 1997); organizational identification 
asks, “Who am I” (Dutton, Dukerich & Harquail, 1994) or “How important is my membership in 
the organization for my identity/sense of self” (Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000), and job involvement 
asks, “How important is the job and job performance to my self-image” (Lawler & Hall, 1970). 
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Psychological ownership also differs from stewardship. Stewardship theory assumes that 
managers value cooperative behaviour per se; that they are intrinsically motivated to act in good 
faith; and that they behave in the best interest of their organization, subordinating their personal 
interests (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson, 1990). While this may be true 
sometimes, substantial empirical evidence shows that selfish, opportunistic behaviour of 
managers is prevalent (Ezzamel, 2005; Judge & Ferris, 1993; Tosi, Gomez-Mejia, Loughry, 
Werner, Banning, Katz, Harris & Silva, 1999). Psychological ownership basically retains agency 
theory's assumption of the self-interested manager, whereas the non-economic functions of 
ownership, such as efficacy, identity, and territoriality, might curtail expropriating behaviour and 
align the interests of agents and principals (cp. Pierce et al., 2003). 
Psychological ownership can be observed across all organizational levels (Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1997; Kellermanns, Walter, Lechner & Floyd, 2005) or even as a collective 
phenomenon (Pierce & Jussila, 2010). Research has documented numerous pro-organizational 
attitudinal and behavioural consequences of psychological ownership, such as increased affective 
commitment (Avey et al., 2009; Liu, Wang, Hui & Lee, 2012), extra-role behaviour (Pierce, Van 
Dyne & Cummings, 1992), organizational citizenship behaviour (Liu et al., 2012; Van Dyne & 
Pierce, 2004), job satisfaction (O’Driscoll, Pierce & Coghlan, 2006), and reduced workplace 
deviance (Avey et al., 2009). However, a link to individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour as a 
potential mechanism through which psychological ownership relates to company performance 
has not been investigated yet. Even more importantly, the central claim that agents who exhibit 
high levels of psychological ownership think and act as psychological principals even in the 
absence of legal ownership also remains empirically untested (see Pierce et al., 2003). To test 
this claim, relying on individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour seems appropriate, as it is 
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assumed to be a behavioural tendency that is rather attributed to principals than to agents. Hence, 
it allows us to evaluate whether agents with strong ownership feelings are more likely to exhibit 
principal-like behaviour.  
 
Entrepreneurial behaviour 
Individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour is defined as the actions of managers that explicitly 
refer to the discovery and exploitation of unnoticed entrepreneurial opportunities (Kuratko, 2010; 
Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Smith & Di Gregorio, 2002). While all managers are jointly 
responsible for entrepreneurial actions (Burgelman, 1983), individual-level entrepreneurial 
behaviour can vary across managerial levels (Kuratko et al., 2005). In particular, Hornsby et al. 
(2009) emphasize the critical role of senior managers, as entrepreneurial ideas and actions are 
more likely to arise from their activities than from tasks performed at lower managerial levels 
(Beal, 2000). For example, senior managers explicitly “identify effective means through which 
new businesses can be created or existing ones reconfigured” (Hornsby et al., 2009, p. 236) and 
scan the environment for opportunities and threats (Kraut, Pedigo, McKenna & Dunnette, 2005). 
Put differently, senior managers, as part of their jobs, frequently recognize, surface, and generate 
innovative and entrepreneurial ideas (Burgelman, 1983; Kraut et al., 2005; Shepherd, McMullen 
& Jennings, 2007) from within and outside the firm (e.g., by observing the market and 
competition) (see also Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). In addition, scholars regard efforts that 
support others, such as subordinates, in acting entrepreneurially as important element of 
entrepreneurial behaviour (Kuratko, 2010; Kuratko, Ireland & Hornsby, 2004).  
The attributes that scholars have used to define individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour 
permit us to conceptually distinguish it from related concepts such as improvisation (which also 
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includes dimensions referring to pressure and persistence, see Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008; 
Hmieleski & Corbett, 2006) or proactiveness (which tends to neglect the idea generation 
dimension, see Bateman & Crant, 1993). As entrepreneurial behaviour explicitly refers to 
behaviour at the individual level, it is also distinct from firm-level entrepreneurship constructs. 
Corporate entrepreneurship, for instance, refers to firm-level activities “aimed at creating new 
businesses in established companies through product and process innovations and market 
developments” (Zahra, 1991, p. 262; Zahra et al., 1999). Similarly, entrepreneurial orientation 
(EO) has been conceptualized in terms of five dimensions that characterize and distinguish key 
entrepreneurial processes at the firm level and that provide the basis for entrepreneurial decisions 
and actions (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin & Frese, 2009). 
 
HYPOTHESES 
Our theoretical starting point is the implicit assumption of agency theory that higher levels of 
formal ownership generate higher levels of ownership feelings. While formal ownership can be 
accompanied by low or non-existing ownership feelings, such feelings may arise even in the 
absence of formal ownership. To link psychological ownership, individual-level entrepreneurial 
behaviour, and firm performance, we draw from the basic claim of psychology literature that 
feelings of ownership have important attitudinal and behavioural effects (Beggan, 1992; 
Formanek, 1991; Pierce et al., 2003; Porteous, 1976).  
More specifically, we propose that psychological ownership toward a company induces the 
agent’s strong desire to contribute to firm performance due to identity considerations. When 
agents experience a sense of place, belonging, and personal space regarding their company, they 
will experience ”mere ownership” (Beggan, 1992) and develop feelings of attachment and 
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belonging (Pierce et al., 2003). As a result, the firm as the target of ownership feelings will play 
such a dominant role in their identity that it will become part of the person’s extended self (Belk, 
1988; Dittmar, 1992; Pierce et al., 2003). This experience is important because as William James 
(1890) observed, “a man’s Self is the sum total of all that he can call his […]. All these things 
give the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die, he 
feels cast down” (p. 291-292). Similarly, Formanek (1991) argues that the growth of possessions 
produces a positive and uplifting effect for the owner. Possessions also play a crucial role in 
social interaction as they communicate the individual’s identity to others, which generates 
recognition and prestige (Dittmar, 1992; McCracken, 1986; Pierce et al., 2003). If a company 
forms an integral part of its owners’ identity, and given that individuals strive to maintain and 
enhance identity (Korman, 1970; Pierce et al., 2001), then psychological owners should be 
highly motivated to contribute to strong firm performance, perhaps as much as principals 
(Chrisman et al., 2007; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; McDonald et al., 2008). We treat company 
performance in this paper as a multi-faceted construct that includes not only financial aspects, 
but also other elements such as job creation (Eddleston, Kellermanns & Sarathy, 2008). 
Psychological owners can enhance company performance in many ways. Among the 
correlates of ownership feelings that can affect company performance are extra-role behaviour 
(Pierce et al., 1992), organizational citizenship behaviour (Liu et al., 2012; Pierce et al., 2004), 
and lower levels of workplace deviance (Avey et al., 2009). We suggest that individual-level 
entrepreneurial behaviour is another activity that could represent a mechanism through which 
psychological ownership can influence company performance and that differs reliably depending 
on whether someone is the owner or non-owner of a company. Building on the argument that 
individuals who feel they own an object behave differently than non-owners (Beggan, 1992; 
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Formanek, 1991; Porteous, 1976), we propose different routes through which ownership feelings 
of senior managers can motivate them to engage in entrepreneurial behaviour. 
One of these routes is when ownership feelings induce a heightened sense of responsibility for 
the ownership target (Korman, 1970; Pierce et al., 2001). A sense of responsibility should lead 
managers to invest time and energy, assume greater personal risk (Pierce et al., 2001), promote 
change (Dirks, Cummings & Pierce, 1996), and engage in socially desirable behaviours 
(Cummings & Anton, 1990). It seems reasonable to suggest that the investment of time and 
energy, the assumption of risk, and the promotion of change are reflected in psychological 
owners who generate ideas and seek to exploit them (Burgelman, 1983; Kuratko, 2010; Smith & 
Di Gregorio, 2002). Furthermore, because a sense of responsibility induced by ownership 
feelings also raises awareness for socially desirable behaviour, psychological owners may be 
more inclined to support others in acting entrepreneurially, which is another attribute of 
individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour identified in the literature (Kuratko, 2010).  
A second route that connects ownership feelings with entrepreneurial behaviour is 
empowerment. Van Dyne and Pierce (2004) suggest that ownership feelings are related to 
feelings of empowerment (Spreitzer, 1995), whereby empowered individuals believe they are 
autonomous and have an impact. This increases the likelihood that those individuals will be 
creative, innovative, and expect success (Amabile, 1988; Redmond, Mumford & Teach, 1993). 
Indeed, a link between feelings of empowerment, the initiation of change and innovative 
behaviour is strongly supported by previous studies (see overview by Spreitzer, 1995). If 
psychological owners feel empowered, and if empowerment is linked to creativity, innovation, 
and change stimulation, then there should be a positive link between psychological ownership 
and individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour, which is essentially about discovering and 
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exploiting innovative ideas and opportunities (Burgelman, 1983; Kuratko, 2010; Smith & Di 
Gregorio, 2002).  
The third route through which ownership feelings can drive entrepreneurial behaviour is the 
need for efficacy and control. Individuals have an inherent need for efficacy and seek to produce 
desired outcomes (White, 1959). This desire to satisfy this need propels them to explore and 
manipulate their environment (Pierce et al., 2003). Psychological owners tend to feel they have 
some control over the firm (Pierce et al., 2003; White, 1959), which can lead them to believe that 
they are entitled to have a voice in decisions that impact the ownership target (Pierce et al., 
1991). We argue that enhanced perceptions of control can influence them to try to alter activities 
and processes in a company, which enhances perceptions of self-efficacy (Beggan, 1992; White, 
1959). To exercise and demonstrate control over the firm to oneself and to others (Dirks et al., 
1996) and to nurture individual self-efficacy, senior managers who experience psychological 
ownership may engage in entrepreneurial behaviour. Generating new ideas, identifying and 
exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities, as well as helping others in such attempts, is likely to 
fundamentally change key aspects of the company, such as markets served, product range, 
production processes, and technologies applied. Such changes signal control and ability to act, 
ultimately strengthening perceptions of self-efficacy. Indeed, the positive link between self-
efficacy and entrepreneurial action has been well documented (Chen, Greene & Crick, 1998; 
Zhao, Hills & Seibert, 2005). 
Finally, we draw on the traditional agency theory argument whereby legal ownership 
enhances the proclivity to invest in innovation and to act in novel ways (Cho, 1998; Hill & Snell, 
1989). For legal ownership to generate these effects, however, ownership feelings must first 
evolve (Pierce & Furo, 1990; Pierce et al., 1991). Following our theoretical reasoning, we expect 
  
16 
the same effects to occur when ownership feelings exist in the absence of formal ownership 
(Pierce et al., 2003). Investing in innovation and acting in novel ways link ownership feelings 
with entrepreneurial behaviour, as the latter directly refers to innovative ideas and novel ways of 
action. Based on our discussion of the four routes through which psychological ownership might 
motivate entrepreneurial behaviour we test the following hypothesis:  
H1: Psychological ownership of agents toward their company is positively related to 
their individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour. 
 
Literature views individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour as a core aspect of and critical 
antecedent to firm-level corporate entrepreneurship. It is the behaviour through which the latter 
is practiced and put into action in established organizations (Hornsby, Kuratko & Zahra, 2002; 
Kuratko et al., 2004; Kuratko et al., 2005); it constitutes corporate entrepreneurship’s operational 
essence (Hornsby et al., 2002; Kuratko, 2010). In a similar vein, Burgelman (1983) finds that the 
“motor” of corporate entrepreneurship resides in the autonomous initiatives of individuals 
within the organization (p. 241). Put differently, individual-level entrepreneuial behavior is the 
foundation for implementing corporate entrepreneurship at the firm level (Kuratko, 2010; Smith 
& Di Gregorio, 2002). Corporate entrepreneurship, in turn, is the conduit though which 
individual-level entrepreneurial behavior leads to competitive advantage (Dess, Lumpkin & 
McGee, 1999; Kuratko, Hornsby, Naffziger & Montagno, 1993) and improved company 
performance (Zahra, 1991). Indeed, the positive link between corporate entrepreneurship and 
company performance is well established (Covin & Slevin, 1991; Guth & Ginsberg, 1990; 
Rogoff & Heck, 2003). Combining these arguments, we expect individual-level entrepreneurial 
behaviour of psychological owners to be positively related to company performance, which is the 
ultimate goal of both psychological owners and principals:  
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H2: Individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour of agents exhibiting psychological 
ownership toward their company is positively related to company performance. 
 
The preceding arguments explain why ownership feelings are positively related to individual-
level entrepreneurial behaviour and why the latter is positively related to company performance. 
To further justify these links we draw from expectancy theory (Steel & Konig, 2006; Vroom, 
1964). It assumes that the value of a first-level outcome is a function of the instrumentality of 
that behaviour for the actor and the value of the second-level (organizational-level) outcome 
associated with that behaviour (Pierce et al., 1991). In our model, individual-level 
entrepreneurial behaviour is a first-level outcome with high value for the psychological owner, as 
discussed previously. Company performance is a second-level organizational outcome associated 
with entrepreneurial behaviour that has high value itself, as it constitutes the main goal of 
psychological owners. In sum, our theorizing suggests that entrepreneurial behaviour mediates 
the relationship between psychological ownership and company performance (Baron & Kenny, 
1986; Preacher & Hayes, 2008b). Consequently, we hypothesize the following: 
H3: Individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour mediates the relationship between agents' 
psychological ownership and company performance. 
 
Monitoring of Psychological Owners 
Monitoring mechanisms such as direct observation of the agent, performance evaluation, and 
assessing progress toward goals can alleviate information asymmetries between principals and 
agents (Eisenhardt, 1989). By making behaviour more transparent, monitoring helps to curb 
opportunism (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ross, 1973) and motivates positive behaviour (Chrisman et al., 
2007). Building on this assumption, we extend our previous predictions by suggesting that the 
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relationship between psychological ownership, entrepreneurial behaviour, and company 
performance is contingent on the level of monitoring. 
Under low levels of monitoring, a strong positive relationship between psychological 
ownership and individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour is likely to be observed. This will 
occur because when both monitoring and psychological ownership are low, agency theory 
predicts that agents are inclined to shirk their duty and do not invest their limited resources in 
entrepreneurial activities that are in the principal’s interest but in not theirs. However, increases 
in psychological ownership motivate entrepreneurial behaviour through the routes of heightened 
responsibility, empowerment, efficacy, sense of control, proclivity to invest in innovation, and 
acting in novel ways even when monitoring is low.  
Under high levels of monitoring, we expect the relationship between psychological ownership 
and individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour to be weaker. When monitoring is high and 
psychological ownership is low, managerial mischief and opportunism will be curbed in 
accordance with the traditional agency argument (Chrisman et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Building on our previous arguments, a high level of monitoring 
should therefore encourage entrepreneurial behaviour among agents with low psychological 
ownership. When psychological ownership increases, however, there is a stronger alignment of 
interests between agents and principals (Pierce et al., 2003). For agents with high psychological 
ownership, though, high levels of monitoring are essentially superfluous, as they are already 
motivated to act like principals (Chrisman et al., 2007; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). 
Put differently, the marginal beneficial effect of high levels of monitoring on entrepreneurial 
behaviour is reduced, although not completely erased, due to alignment of interests induced by 
psychological ownership. Hence, we expect that under conditions of high monitoring, the 
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difference in entrepreneurial behaviour between weak and strong psychological owners is lower 
than under conditions of low monitoring, mainly because high monitoring brings weak 
psychological owners’ entrepreneurial behaviour closer to that of strong psychological owners. 
Hence, the positive effect of psychological ownership on individual-level entrepreneurial 
behaviour should be stronger when monitoring is low compared to when it is high:  
Hypothesis 4a: Monitoring moderates the positive relationship between agents' 
psychological ownership and their individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour such that 
the relationship is stronger when monitoring is low compared to when it is high. 
 
We further propose that monitoring conditionally influences the strength of the hypothesized 
indirect relationship between psychological ownership and company performance through 
individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour, as formally stated below:  
Hypothesis 4b: Monitoring moderates the positive and indirect effect of agents' 
psychological ownership on company performance (through agents' individual-level 
entrepreneurial behaviour) such that the relationship is stronger when monitoring is low 
compared to when it is high. 
 
METHOD 
Sample and Procedure 
We purchased addresses of managers from the two largest professional address data providers 
in Switzerland and Germany. The selection criterion was “senior managers”, defined as heads 
or directors of various departments (e.g., marketing, research and development, production, 
logistics, human resources, sales). These senior managers are considered as credible key 
informants (Kumar, Stern & Anderson, 1993). No further selection criteria were applied, which 
allowed us to randomly retrieve 10,750 valid email addresses. We sent those managers an email 
with a link to an identification-based online survey instrument that prevented multiple responses. 
With one reminder email, we achieved a response rate of 9.5%. Research shows that a 10-12% 
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response rate is typical for studies that target managers in mid-sized firms (MacDougall & 
Robinson, 1990) and executives in upper echelons (Geletkanycz, 1998; Koch & McGrath, 1996). 
Our rate of 9.5% is thus comparable to studies in similar settings. We used only fully completed 
questionnaires for our analyses and excluded managers who own company shares, given our 
interest in ownership feelings in the absence of legal ownership. This resulted in a final sample 
of 714 respondents. Managers’ mean age is 45.9 years (S.D. = 8.68); 28.6% are female. Mean 
tenure with the firm is 12.33 years (S.D. = 9.41 years); 60.5% hold a University or University of 
Applied Science (“Fachhochschule”) degree. Average company size is 1009.7 employees (S.D. 
= 4'200.81; range = 22 - 65'000; median = 250), with 55.8% of the companies in the 
manufacturing and 25.3% in the service sector. Mean firm age is 75.42 years (S.D. = 61.78); 
only approximately 3 per cent of all firms are publicly held.  
 
Measures 
Psychological ownership. We used a seven-item instrument developed and validated by 
Pierce et al. (1992) and Pierce et al. (2004) which is commonly used in empirical psychological 
ownership studies (e.g., Liu et al., 2012; O’Driscoll et al., 2006). Sample items include "This is 
my organization" and "I feel a very high degree of personal ownership for this organization." 
The seven-point Likert-type scale ranges from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. 
Cronbach's Alpha is 0.88. After translating the scale from English into German, two independent 
bilingual experts unfamiliar with the original scale re-translated the items from German into 
English. Together with a native English speaker, the original English version of the scale was 
compared with the translation. No major differences were found. This translation procedure was 
applied to all measures. All items appear in Appendix A. 
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Entrepreneurial behaviour. As illustrated, individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour of 
senior managers is conceptually distinct from firm-level constructs such as corporate 
entrepreneurship or entrepreneurial orientation (EO). It refers to individuals’ actions related to 
the discovery and exploitation of unnoticed entrepreneurial opportunities (Smith & Di Gregorio, 
2002). These actions include identifying new means to create new businesses or reconfigure 
existing ones (Hornsby et al., 2009), scanning the environment for opportunities and threats 
(Kraut et al., 2005), recognizing, surfacing, and generating innovative and entrepreneurial ideas 
by observing the market and competition (Burgelman, 1983; Kraut et al., 2005; Shepherd et al., 
2007), as well as helping others to act entrepreneurially (Kuratko, 2010). Building on this 
definition, we relied on the following six items as they adequately reflect the constructs’ core 
essence as defined in the literature in general and the context of senior managers in particular:1 
“I often make innovative suggestions to improve our business” (based on Eddleston & 
Kellermanns, 2007); “I often generate new ideas by observing the world”; “I often come to new 
ideas when observing how people interact with our products and services”; “I often generate 
new ideas by observing our customers” (based on Dyer et al., 2008); “I boldly move ahead with 
a promising new approach when others might be more cautious”; and “I devote time to help 
others find ways to improve our products and services” (see Pearce et al., 1997). The Likert-type 
scale ranges from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree; Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.83.2 
Monitoring. Four items from Chrisman et al. (2007) were used. Sample items include "In our 
company there is personal, direct observation"; "In our company, short-term performance is 
evaluated regularly"; and "To assess my performance, input from other managers and 
subordinates is used." Items range from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree on a seven-
point Likert-type scale. Cronbach's Alpha is 0.70. 
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Company performance. Because reliable performance data about privately held firms, which 
represent the majority of the firms in our sample, are very difficult to obtain, it is customary to 
rely on self-reported performance data. We asked respondents to rate their company's current 
performance compared to their competitors in five areas: growth in sales, growth in market 
share, growth in profits, job creation, and growth in profitability (adapted from Dess & 
Robinson, 1984; Eddleston et al., 2008). Performance indicators were measured on a seven-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from worse (1) to better (7). Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.93.3 
Control variables. We used dummy variables for industry and service sectors, as the 
competitive environment of a company may impact entrepreneurial activities and performance 
(cp. Antoncic & Hisrich, 2001). Variables were coded “0” for companies not active in the 
respective industry and “1” otherwise. We also controlled for company age and size as well as 
respondents' age, gender, and tenure (see Hornsby et al., 2009). For gender, we used a dummy 
variable with “0” for female and “1” for male. As company size is not normally distributed, we 
used its natural logarithm. Also, we controlled for the presence of incentive-based pay systems 
that may create interest alignment next to formal ownership (e.g., Block & MacMillan, 1993) by 
using a dummy variable, coded “1” in the presence of such pay systems, and “0” otherwise. 
 
RESULTS 
To test for non-response bias, data from early and late respondents were compared using 
ANOVA, a test based on the assumption that late respondents are more similar to non-
respondents than are early respondents (cp. Oppenheim, 1966). We found no significant 
differences in the mean scores of our variables. In addition, we compared the answers of 
managers who completed the whole survey with the answers of those who filled out only part of 
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the survey and dropped out before completion. For the variables that were available for both 
groups, we did not detect any significant differences in the respective mean scores. This indicates 
that non-response bias is not a serious problem in our sample.  
To address the potential of common method bias, we conducted Harman's one factor test 
(Harman, 1967; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Even though it is not without limitations, this 
procedure is still commonly used. An exploratory factor analysis with all our study variables (cp. 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003) leads to a four-factor solution which accounts 
for 57.12% of the total variance. The first factor explains 28.44% of the variance, which provides 
initial evidence that common method bias is not a major problem because no single factor 
accounts for the majority of variance. As additional precaution and to assess the validity and 
distinctiveness of our measures for psychological ownership, individual-level entrepreneurial 
behaviour, company performance, and monitoring, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). The corresponding structure shows an acceptable fit (χ2(150) = 1117.4, 
GFI = 0.902, CFI = 0.904, RMSEA = 0.079). The results of a one-factor structure are 
significantly worse (χ2(170) = 6330.4, GFI = 0.577, CFI = 0.386, RMSEA = 0.188; difference in 
χ2 = 5213, df = 20, p < 0.001). We also centred the variables (Aiken & West, 1991) and found 
that the Variance Inflation Factor does not exceed 2.3 and that the condition index does not 
exceed 2.96. This suggests that multicollinearity is not a concern (Hair et al., 2006). 
We tested our moderated mediation model in two steps (cp. Preacher et al., 2007). First, we 
tested a simple mediation model (Hypotheses 1-3). Second, we tested the proposed moderation 
effect (Hypothesis 4a) and the overall moderated mediation model (Hypothesis 4b). To test the 
mediation model, we applied the SPSS macro of Preacher and Hayes (2008a) which combines 
the stepwise procedure of Baron & Kenny (1986) with the Sobel test and also allows 
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bootstrapping. This macro has been applied in recent studies that investigate mediation effects 
(e.g., Cole, Walter & Bruch, 2008; Ng & Chan, 2008). The moderated mediation effect, also 
known as conditional indirect effect, is tested with another SPSS macro developed by Preacher et 
al. (2007). It tests for a statistically significant indirect effect which depends on the value of a 
moderator, including the recommended bootstrapping (see also Cole et al., 2008; Ng & Chan, 
2008). Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations appear in Table I. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table I about here 
------------------------------------------ 
Table II presents the results for Hypotheses 1-3. There is a positive significant relationship 
between psychological ownership and individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour, supporting 
Hypothesis 1 (β = 0.16, p < 0.001). In support of Hypothesis 2, we find a positive significant 
relationship between individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour and performance (β = 0.12, p < 
0.001). We also reveal an indirect effect of psychological ownership on company performance, 
which supports Hypothesis 3. The formal two-tailed significance test shows that the indirect 
effect is significant (z = 3.25, p < 0.01). Bootstrap results confirm the Sobel test with a 
bootstrapped 99% CI around the indirect effect not containing zero (0.003, 0.042). The direct 
effect of psychological ownership on performance is smaller than the total effect, indicating 
partial mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Preacher & Hayes, 2008b). 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table II about here 
------------------------------------------ 
With entrepreneurial behaviour as the dependent variable, Table III shows that the interaction 
term of psychological ownership and monitoring is significant and negative (β = -0.05, p < 0.05), 
supporting Hypothesis 4a. To illustrate the interaction effect, we plotted simple slopes one 
standard deviation below and one above the mean of the monitoring measure (Figure 2). 
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--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table III and Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Table III also shows that the interaction term of psychological ownership and monitoring is 
negatively significant in the dependent variable model (β = -0.07, p < 0.01), which supports 
Hypothesis 4b. In addition, we examined the conditional indirect effect of psychological 
ownership on performance through individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour at three values of 
monitoring: the mean (4.19) as well as one standard deviation above (5.21) and below (3.17) the 
mean. Normal-theory tests show that the conditional indirect effect is significant (p < 0.05) only 
for the two lower values of monitoring. Applying the Johnson-Neyman method in the macro of 
Preacher et al. (2007) reveals that the conditional indirect effect is significant at p < 0.05 for 
values of monitoring between 3.1 and 4.6. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our study investigates whether ownership feelings in the absence of formal ownership can 
align agents’ interests with those of principals, thus turning agents into psychological principals. 
Applying a moderated mediation model to a sample of 714 non-owning senior managers from 
two European countries, we show that individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour mediates the 
positive relationship between psychological ownership and company performance, whereas this 
indirect effect depends on the level of monitoring. 
Our findings make several contributions to the literature. First, our study complements 
standard agency writings that have emphasized formal ownership of managers (see Daily et al., 
2003; Dalton et al., 2003; Pugh et al., 2000) by showing that psychological ownership without 
formal ownership can align the interests of agents and principals. One advantage of 
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psychological ownership over other proposed remedies is that it avoids the costs associated with 
agent stock ownership. As high monitoring becomes increasingly ineffective with rising 
ownership feelings, monitoring agents with strong ownership feelings could be reduced, which 
would lower agency costs. Our findings also offer agency theorists a possible explanation of the 
inconclusive results regarding the effect of agents’ stock ownership on company performance 
(Daily et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 2003; Pugh et al., 2000). As Pierce and Furo (1990) note, 
formal ownership will only lead to behavioural consequences if ownership feelings are first 
created. And for these ownership feelings to emerge, stock ownership programs need to provide 
rights to obtain information and to exercise influence in addition to the right to hold shares. Even 
though we investigate psychological ownership as an alternative to legal ownership and do not 
test for their interaction, the fact that, in many studies, stock ownership of managers fails to 
generate the intended performance effects might be due to the failure of formal ownership 
programs to create sufficiently high levels of psychological ownership. By showing that 
ownership feelings in the absence of legal ownership align the interests of principals and agents, 
we complement the “I own – I do” relationship from standard agency theory with the “I feel I 
own – I do” relationship from psychological ownership literature. 
It is important to reiterate that our underlying assumption about managers is consistent with 
agency theory. That is, agents are self-centred and seek to achieve their own goals through the 
pursuit of individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour, which leads to enhanced company 
performance. However, we depart from standard agency theory assumptions by arguing that 
formal ownership is not a necessary precondition to incentivize agents to align their goals with 
those of the principal. Since perceptions of ownership fulfil basic human needs, such as efficacy, 
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identity, and territoriality, it is psychological owners’ experience of non-financial benefits of 
ownership that can lead to interest alignment and the curtailing of expropriating behaviour. 
We do not, however, support the absence of opportunism that is argued for under the 
stewardship, identification, and commitment theory umbrellas (e.g., Davis et al., 1997; Mael & 
Ashforth, 1992; Mowday, Porter & Steers, 1982). Scholars who take this position generally 
believe that monitoring systems predicated on the risk of opportunism are counterproductive. 
This is because they undermine stewards’ pro-organizational desires, signal distrust, lead to 
relationships dominated by utilitarian quid pro quo economic exchanges through the use of 
incentives and crowd out pro-organizational behaviour in general (Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999; 
Takahashi, 2000). Hence, if psychological owners were stewards, they would reduce their 
absolute level of entrepreneurial behaviour when being monitored. We do not find such an effect. 
Taken together, we do not regard managers as selfless and altruistic stewards, but rather as 
opportunistic agents who reciprocate since doing so advances their own cause. 
A second contribution of our study is to the psychological ownership literature. Ours is the 
first study we know of to empirically verify the claim that psychological ownership turns agents 
into psychological principals (Pierce et al., 2003). Our findings underline the relevance of 
psychological ownership and give psychological ownership scholars empirical reasons for 
connecting their work with that of agency theorists. In addition, our results speak to those 
scholars who have focused on the outcomes of psychological ownership (Avey et al., 2009; Liu 
et al., 2012). Based on theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, we introduce individual-
level entrepreneurial behaviour and, indirectly, company performance as new correlates. 
Furthermore, we also address the question of whether psychological ownership converts agents 
into stewards (Pierce et al., 2003). As demonstrated, we do not find evidence for this claim. Our 
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results also address the issue of a potential downside of psychological ownership (Pierce et al., 
2003). Arguments pertaining to a preventive part of psychological ownership (Avey et al., 2009) 
or defensive territorial behaviours (Brown, Lawrence & Robinson, 2005) suggest that excessive 
levels of ownership feelings could lead to less individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour. 
However, both our theoretical reasoning and our empirical findings show the opposite. In 
addition, a post-hoc test for a curvilinear relationship between psychological ownership and 
individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour was not significant. 
A third contribution of our study is to the literature on entrepreneurship. We show that 
individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour is an effective way of assessing whether ownership 
feelings are expressed, which complements existing research on that type of behaviour (e.g., 
Kuratko et al., 2005) and illustrates the value that entrepreneurship research could have in the 
agency theory context. We also provide empirical support for the arguments of some scholars 
who view individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour as an antecedent to corporate 
entrepreneurship (Hornsby et al., 2002; Kuratko et al., 2005) and who investigate the corporate 
entrepreneurship-performance link (Covin & Slevin, 1991; Zahra, 1995). Combining these 
perspectives led us to hypothesize and confirm a previously untested link between individual-
level entrepreneurial behaviour and company performance. Lastly, while past entrepreneurship 
research has mainly considered organizational factors as antecedents to entrepreneurial 
behaviour (Hornsby et al., 2009; Hornsby et al., 2002; Kuratko et al., 2005), we emphasize the 
importance of individual-level factors such as psychological ownership.  
For practitioners, our study offers valuable insights by introducing a new way to contend with 
agency problems. Our findings suggest that company owners should seriously consider the 
effects of increasing psychological ownership among non-owning managers (Pierce et al., 2003; 
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Pierce et al., 2004). Doing so could allow them to forego the use of costly incentives and stock 
ownership plans as interest alignment mechanisms. Since formal ownership is not necessary for 
ownership feelings, this approach might be especially appealing to family firms, which constitute 
the majority of firms around the world (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; Sharma, 2004). This is due 
to the fact that diluting control by giving shares to non-family managers opposes the dominant 
wish of many families to maintain transgenerational control (Chua, Chrisman & Sharma, 1999; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Notwithstanding its theoretical and practical contributions, we would be remiss not to note the 
limitations of our study. First, we cannot derive conclusions with regard to causality because we 
used cross-sectional survey data. However, we think that our theoretical reasoning, our empirical 
tests, the collection of multiple responses for a subset of firms, the validation of our subjective 
dependent variable using objective data, as well as our additional precautions against common 
method bias lend validity to our measures and results. Second, our findings may be limited by 
the moderate response rate of 9.5%. However, based on sample characteristics and tests for non-
response bias we are confident that our data constitute a representative sample. Third, we cannot 
rule out that social desirability bias is present in our data. If so, however, we believe that our 
central variables are equally susceptible to such a bias, as they all refer to positively connoted 
pro-organizational attitudes, behaviours, and outcomes. Hence, we suggest that the nature of the 
relationships between our variables would not be fundamentally altered. Last, there might be a 
cultural bias, as all respondents are from Germany and Switzerland. While these two countries 
can be regarded as very similar in cultural terms (cp. Hofstede, 2001), a cultural bias might exist 
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in comparison to other countries. Legal arrangements, social elements and culture as a context 
factor may differ between countries and may influence conceptualizations of ownership and 
related feelings (Pierce et al., 2003; Rousseau & Shperling, 2003).  
The findings of our study open up numerous avenues for future research, which, in turn, could 
also address the abovementioned limitations. First, we encourage agency theory scholars to delve 
deeper into the examination of the effectiveness of stock ownership plans. Here, the role of 
psychological ownership could be investigated in more detail. Examples are levels of agent stock 
ownership and characteristics of ownership programs that are most likely to foster ownership 
feelings (cp. Ang et al., 2000; Pierce & Furo, 1990) as well as the joint effects of formal and 
psychological ownership (cp. Pierce & Furo, 1990). As a whole, this might better explain the (in-
)effectiveness of stock ownership (Daily et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 2003; Pugh et al., 2000). Next 
to psychological ownership, we also recommend the application of individual-level 
entrepreneurial behaviour in the agency theory context, as we have shown that it is a reliable 
mean to evaluate agents’ expression of ownership feelings. In addition, as psychological 
ownership can lead to different behavioural and attitudinal consequences (Pierce et al., 2003) and 
as we find a partial mediation effect of entrepreneurial behaviour, it could be useful for agency 
scholars to test alternative mediators such as affective commitment or organizational citizenship 
behaviour (Avey et al., 2009) in a moderated mediation model. While many agency theory 
studies focus only on the CEO level (Cruz et al., 2010), we encourage researchers to test our 
model on different managerial hierarchy levels, since hierarchy might affect pro-organizational 
behaviour (Hornsby et al., 2009). Second, we note for psychological ownership scholars that 
ownership feelings, unlike legal ownership, do not protect agents from owner opportunism such 
as hold-up (Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Williamson, 1985). In this context, it may thus be of interest 
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to examine how stable or fragile such feelings are in light of the decisions and behaviours of the 
formal owners. As psychological ownership is thought to foster feelings of burden-sharing with 
the organization (Pierce et al., 2003), it may also be valuable to explore the advantages and 
disadvantages of psychological ownership in the face of economic decline. Third, we encourage 
entrepreneurship scholars to expand their research into the agency theory domain, as the 
construct of individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour may enrich traditional agency research by 
taking a fresh look at the effect of stock ownership programs. Finally, building on the fact that 
our sample included respondents from Germany and Switzerland only, we call for a replication 
of our study in other cultural contexts with differing conceptualizations of ownership to see if 
our findings are upheld (Rousseau & Shperling, 2003).  
 
CONCLUSION 
Summing up, our study shows that psychological ownership is a viable way to alleviate 
agency problems. Our moderated mediation model tested on a sample of 714 non-owning senior 
managers shows that psychological ownership can turn agents into psychological principals. 
Adding to one of the most vivid discussions in managerial theory, our study provides fresh 
insights for research and practice and opens up many promising avenues for future research. 
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NOTES 
                                                          
1 We also considered the Pearce, Kramer and Robbins (1997) and the Dyer, Gregersen and Christensen (2008) scales for 
entrepreneurial and innovative behaviour as measurement instruments. However, while both scales capture certain aspects of 
individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour as defined in the literature, they are incomplete or biased in certain dimensions. The 
Pearce et al. (1997) scale is geared towards proactiveness and does not adequately capture entrepreneurial aspects such as idea 
generation. The Dyer et al. (2008) scale captures the idea generation element, but has a much broader scope that reaches beyond 
the main definition of entrepreneurial behaviour, for instance by including networking activities. We wish to thank an anonymous 
reviewer for pointing at these aspects. 
2 Next to face validity, statistical tests indicate that our measure appropriately captures individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour 
as defined in the literature. First, our Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.83 is well above the critical threshold, suggesting internal 
consistency of the measure (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson & Tatham, 2006). Second, all six items load on one factor, with factor 
loadings between 0.64 and 0.82. Third, a factor analysis performed on our sample using items from an established measure of 
corporate entrepreneurship (based on Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007) reveals that our six entrepreneurial behaviour items all 
load on one separate factor, with factor loadings between 0.61 and 0.81 (Cronbach’s Alpha for the corporate entrepreneurship 
measure: 0.84). Together with the high correlation between our entrepreneurial behaviour measure and the corporate 
entrepreneurship measure (0.28, p < 0.01) this supports our claim about the distinctiveness and at the same time relatedness of 
individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour and firm-level corporate entrepreneurship. Fourth, our measure exhibits convergent 
validity, as we find high correlations with the complete measures of Pearce et al. (1997) (0.69, p < 0.01) and Dyer et al. (2008) 
(0.78, p < 0.01), which were also included in our data set.  
3 We believe that the use of subjective data is adequate for testing our hypotheses keeping in mind the following considerations 
and precautions. First, subjective performance data has been shown to correlate highly with objective performance data (Dess & 
Robinson, 1984; Love, Priem & Lumpkin, 2002). Second, the reliability of performance data is high when reported in an 
anonymous survey like in our study (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Third, the use of subjective performance data, and more 
specifically, the comparison to similar firms that controls for industry effects, is not uncommon in studies where public 
information is lacking (Love et al., 2002; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz, 2001). Fourth, our respondents can be regarded 
as key informants due to their senior management positions and their average tenure of more than 12 years. We thus believe that 
they have sufficient experience, insight and access to relevant information to provide reliable performance judgments. Fifth, we 
investigated inter-rater agreement in our sample (cp. Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; LeBreton & Senter, 2008). When one target is 
assessed by multiple raters with multiple items, such as company performance in our case, the rwg(j) index may provide the 
necessary empirical support to justify the aggregation of individual-level data to a higher level (e.g., company level) (LeBreton & 
Senter, 2008). As we have 122 double answers from 61 companies in our sample, we calculated the inter-rater agreement for all 
these 61 pairs, achieving an average rwg(j) of 0.77 (median = 0.86). This indicates strong agreement well above the 0.7 threshold 
(LeBreton & Senter, 2008), which supports the validity of our company-level performance measure. Sixth, we tested the validity 
of our subjective performance measure with partly available objective data. 452 of our respondents are employed in Germany-
based companies. For those we obtained objective performance data for 2007-2009 from the German “Elektronischer 
Bundesanzeiger” database where the German ministry of justice compiles audited balance sheets and income statements of 
private firms. We then calculated different objective performance ratios, such as profit growth, return on assets (ROA) growth, 
return on sales (ROS) growth, and return on equity (ROE) growth. When correlating these objective measures with the 
corresponding items of our subjective performance measure, we found the self-reported profit growth item to be positively and 
significantly correlated with objective profit growth (r = 0.29, p < 0.05). Moreover, the self-reported profitability growth item 
was positively and significantly correlated with ROA growth (r = 0.35, p < 0.05), ROE growth (r = 0.37, p < 0.05), and ROS 
growth (r = 0.29, p < 0.05). These correlations are of similar strength compared to other studies that investigate subjective and 
objective performance measures of privately held companies (e.g., Ling & Kellermanns, 2010). In sum, we believe that our 
subjective company performance data represents a reliable measure for the purpose of testing our theoretical predictions. 
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TABLE I 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations 
  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Industry  0.56 .5 1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Service 0.25 .44 -.66** 1 
3 Company Age 75.42 61.78 .03 -.03 1 
4 Number of employees (ln) 5.72 1.11 -.06 .09* .15** 1 
5 Age respondent 45.90 8.68 -.01 .02 .09* .03 1 
6 Gender 0.71 0.45 .08* -.05 .03 .09* .26** 1 
7 Tenure 12.33 9.41 -.04 .01 .12** .03 .51** .11** 1 
8 Performance-based pay 1.38 .48 -.05 .05 .05 -.13** -.09* -.19** .04 1 
9 Psychological Ownership 4.32 1.29 -.02 -.05 .01 .03 .17** .15** .13** -.13** 1 
10 Individual-level entrepr. beh. 4.88 0.88 -.09* .01 .04 .07 .16** .19** .08* -.1** .28* 1 
11 Monitoring 4.19 1.02 -.07 .04 .00 .11** .05 .05 -.04 -.14** .15** .22** 1 
12 Performance 4.64 0.90 -.05 -.02 -.04 .11** .02 .03 .03 -.14** .24** .18** .15** 
N = 714 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
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TABLE II 
Regression Results for Simple Mediation 
Variable B SE t p 
Psychological ownership to entrepr. behaviour (H1) 0.16 0.02 6.21 0.00 
Individual-level entrepr. behaviour on performance (H2) 0.12 0.04 3.2 0.00 
Total effect of psychological ownership on performance  0.16 0.03 6.33 0.00 
Direct effect of psychological ownership on performance 0.14 0.03 5.48 0.00 
Partial effects of control variables on performance 
Industry -0.11 0.08 -1.3 0.19 
Service -0.09 0.1 -0.99 0.32 
Company age 0.00 0.00 -0.98 0.33 
Company size (ln employees) 0.07 0.03 2.45 0.01 
Manager age -0.01 0.00 -1.21 0.23 
Gender -0.05 0.07 -0.66 0.51 
Tenure 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.51 
Performance-based pay -0.2 0.07 -2.97 0.00 
Bootstrap results for indirect effects (H3) 
 Data  Boot Bias SE LL 99% CI UL 99% CI 
Effect 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.003 0.042 
Indirect effect and significance using normal distribution (H3) 
Sobel Value SE LL 99% CI UL 99% CI z p 
 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 3.25 0.00 
Note: N = 714. Unstandardized regression coefficients reported. Bootstrap sample size = 5,000. LL = lower limit, 
UL = upper limit, CI = confidence interval. In Preacher & Hayes' (2008a) SPSS macro, normal theory tests are not 
possible in models with covariates. To conduct the Sobel test, the covariates were thus excluded for this specific 
calculation. 
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TABLE III 
Regression Results for Conditional Indirect Effect 
 Mediator Model (entr. beh.) Dependent var. model (perf.) 
Predictor Coeff SE t p Coeff SE t p 
Constant 2.25 0.53 4.26 0.00 2.3 0.54 4.24 0.00 
Psychological ownership 0.35 0.1 3.48 0.00 0.41 0.1 4.01 0.00 
Monitoring 0.38 0.1 3.5 0.00 0.36 0.11 3.31 0.00 
P.O. times Monitoring (H4a and H4b) -0.05 0.02 -2.15 0.03 -0.07 0.02 -2.77 0.01 
Individual-level entrepr. behaviour  0.1 0.04 2.51 0.01 
Control variables  
Industry -0.21 0.08 -2.54 0.01 -0.1 0.08 -1.18 0.24 
Service -0.08 0.09 -0.89 0.38 -0.09 0.1 -0.1 0.32 
Company age 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.96 0.00 0.00 -1.01 0.29 
Company size (ln employees) 0.03 0.03 0.89 0.37 0.07 0.03 2.36 0.02 
Manager age 0.01 0.00 1.61 0.11 -0.01 0.00 -1.22 0.22 
Gender 0.24 0.07 3.28 0.00 -0.05 0.07 -0.69 0.49 
Tenure 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.45 
Performance-based pay -0.27 0.07 -0.39 0.7 -0.19 0.07 -2.78 0.01 
Conditional indirect effect 
Monitoring Boot 
 
 
Boot SE Boot z Boot p 
- 1 SD (3.17) 0.02 0.01 2.02 0.04 
Mean (4.19) 0.01 0.01 2.09 0.04 
+ 1 SD (5.21) 0.01 0.01 1.52 0.13 
N = 714; unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. Bootstrap sample size = 5,000. 
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FIGURE 1 
Theoretical Model 
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FIGURE 2 
Interaction Plot of P.O. and Monitoring on Individual-level Entrepreneurial Behaviour 
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APPENDIX 
Scale Items, Factor Loadings, and Reliabilities 
Variable Item text Factor loading α 
Psychologi-
cal ownership 
This is MY organization. 0.78 
0.88 
I sense that this organization is OUR company. 0.72 
I feel a very high degree of personal ownership for this organization. 0.83 
I sense that this is MY company. 0.85 
This is OUR company. 0.69 
Most people working for this organization feel as though they own the firm. 0.57 
It is hard for me to think about this organization as MINE (reversed) 0.70 
Individual-
level entrepre-
neurial 
behaviour 
I often make innovative suggestions to improve our business. 0.65 
0.83 
I often generate new ideas by observing the world. 0.82 
I often come to new ideas when observing how people interact with our 
products and services. 
0.82 
I often generate new ideas by observing our customers. 0.75 
I boldly move ahead with a promising new approach when others might be 
more cautious. 
0.64 
I devote time to help others find ways to improve our products and services. 0.74 
Monitoring 
In our company there is personal, direct observation.  0.73 
0.70 
In our company, short-term performance is evaluated regularly. 0.84 
In our company, progress regarding to long-term goals is evaluated 
regularly. 
0.75 
To assess my performance, input from other managers and subordinates is 
used. 
0.48 
Performance 
How would you rate the current performance of your company compared to 
your competitors in the following dimensions?  
 
0.93 
Growth in sales 0.88 
Growth in market share 0.82 
Growth in profits 0.86 
Creation of jobs 0.70 
Growth in profitability 0.83 
 
